17.11.09
WHAT, EXACTLY, IS COGNITIVE DISSONANCE?
Thus far, the majority of these writings have been based on obedience to authority, particularly within the masses, despite a gnawing feeling of tension due to a perceived (or real) inconsistency in attitude versus behavior. This is why one might feel guilt if they were to take something that was not there property. The accompanying feeling most people would describe this as cognitive dissonance.
Cognitive Dissonance
Cognitive dissonance occurs when an individual experiences an inconsistency between two (or more) attitudes or an attitude and behavior(s). There are several possible causes of dissonance: The importance of the attitude(s) involved in the inconsistency; choice versus no choice involved in the inconsistent behavior; and/or negative consequences for others that result from the inconsistent behavior. Because individuals prefer consistency, cognitive dissonance is an uncomfortable state. Therefore, individuals are motivated to alleviate dissonance. They may do so in several ways. Individuals may change their attitude or behavior to bring attitudes/behaviors "more in line" with one another; obtain support for their original attitude; and/or minimize the importance of the inconsistency. To minimize the importance of the inconsistency individuals may attempt to convince themselves that the attitude involved in the inconsistency is unimportant, that their behavior was not freely chosen, or that their behavior resulted in no negative consequences for others.
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) conducted one of the first experiments on cognitive dissonance. Subjects were seventy-one male college students. They were told that they were participating in a experiment examining "Measures of Performance." Upon greeting subjects the experimenter reminded them that an assessment of experiments conducted at the university was being carried out by introductory psychology students. This assessment was announced previously in the subject's classes. The experimenter further explained that while the assessment was unrelated to the experiment the subject was about to participate in, the subject may be interviewed after his completion of the experiment (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
For the first experimental task subjects were required to put twelve spools on a tray, remove them, and then put them on the tray again. Subjects were instructed to use one hand while completing this task. The experimenter sat behind the subject, timing him with a stop watch, while he was completing this task. For the second experimental task subjects were presented with an S board. The S board contained forty-eight square pegs. The subject's task was to turn each peg a quarter of a turn clockwise using only one hand. Once again the experimenter sat behind the subject timing him with a stop watch. Each task took one-half hour to complete (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
The two experimental tasks were not intended to assess "Measure of Performance." Rather, they were a manipulation to induce cognitive dissonance. The goal of the experimenters was actually to create boring, uninteresting tasks. After the subjects completed the tasks the experimenter requested a "favor." He told the subjects that the experiment contained two conditions. One in which subjects were given no introduction to the experiment (this was the condition that the subject was supposedly in), and another in which subjects were given an introduction to the experiment. The experimenter further explained that a student, working for the experimenter, provides the introduction to the subjects. The experimenter also explained that the student includes several points in his introduction; that the experiment was interesting, enjoyable, and fun. After this explanation the experimenter asked the subject if he would wait to speak to this student. The subject was then led to the secretary's office to wait for the student (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
The subject waited in the secretary's office for four minutes, at which time the experimenter, looking somewhat embarrassed and anxious, asked to speak to the subject. The experimenter explained that the student could not make it that day and that another subject, who was in the introduction condition, was waiting to participate in the experiment. The experimenter then asked if the subject would be willing to stand in for the student, and tell the next subject that the experimental tasks were enjoyable, interesting, and fun (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
It is at this point in the experiment that the independent variable was manipulated. The subjects were either offered one dollar or twenty dollars for telling the next subject that the tasks were enjoyable, interesting, and fun. The subject was also informed that he may be called and asked to help the experimenter again for no additional compensation. Regardless of condition (one dollar or twenty dollars) subjects agreed to help the experimenter (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
Subjects were then led back to the secretary's office where the next subject was waiting. The next subject was actually a female student hired by the experimenter to pose as a subject. The female student said little until the subject began informing her that the experiment was interesting, etc.. At this point she informed the subject that she had heard, from a friend, that the experiment was boring. The subject then tried to convince the student that the experiment was interesting. After two minutes of talking to the female student the experimenter entered the room, took the female student to the testing room, and told the subject to see if an introductory psychology student wished to interview him related to the assessment of experiments conducted at the university (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
The interviewer, supposedly a student from an introductory psychology course, then interviewed the subject. This interview was actually the dependent measure in the experiment. Questions asked included whether the experimental tasks were interesting, enjoyable, and whether the subject would be willing to participate in a similar experiment (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
At this point it should be noted that there was a third, control, condition in the experiment. In the control condition subjects engaged in the spool and peg tasks. However, after these tasks they were immediately interviewed. The control condition subjects were not asked to step in for the student who could not make it, nor were they asked to talk to the next subject about the experiment. The control condition served as a measure of the tasks in the absence of cognitive dissonance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
In general the results indicated that the one dollar condition subjects, compared to both the twenty dollars and control condition subjects, rated the task as most enjoyable and interesting, and were most willing to participate in a similar experiment. The control condition subjects, compared to both the one dollar and twenty dollars condition subjects, rated the tasks as least enjoyable and interesting, and were least willing to participate in a similar experiment. These results suggest that the one dollar condition, compared to the twenty dollars condition, experienced the greatest effects of cognitive dissonance and therefore, the greatest pressure to change their attitudes toward the experimental task. Remember one way to alleviate cognitive dissonance is to change one's attitude. In this experiment the subject can not change his behavior, he has already told the female student that the experiment task was enjoyable, interesting, etc.. It is too late for the subject to change his behavior. The twenty dollar condition subjects, in contrast, experienced less pressure to change their attitudes toward the experimental task. The incentive (the twenty dollars) for engaging in the attitude discrepant behavior appeared to justify the behavior. This justification resulted in less pressure to change attitudes toward the experimental task (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
Another early experiment examining cognitive dissonance was conducted by Aronson and Mills (1959). They examined the effect of the severity of initiation into a group on evaluations of the group. Cognitive dissonance suggests that if individuals experience a severe initiation they are likely to experience cognitive dissonance. The cognitive dissonance in this instance involves a behavior (going through the severe initiation) attitude (whether membership in the group was actually worth the severe initiation) discrepancy. Sixty-three college females participated in Aronson and Mills' (1959) experiment. Subjects were told that they were going to discuss sex with other students. Subjects were further informed that the experimenter needed to determine whether the subject was comfortable with discussing this issue (sex), hence the "initiation."
The experiment contained one independent variable with three levels; severe initiation, mild initiation, and control condition. The severe initiation required subjects to read embarrassing sexually explicit material, out loud in the presence of the experimenter, in order to obtain admittance to the group. The mild initiation required subjects to read information that was somewhat embarrassing, in order to join the group. Once again the subjects read the information out loud and in the presence of the experimenter. The control group was not required to read any information prior to joining the group.
All subjects were granted admittance to the group. Subjects were also informed that there were required readings for each discussion. Since the subject had not read the required reading for this particular discussion, they were instructed to listen in on the discussion and not to participate. The subject then listened in on a discussion among three college females. The discussion was actually a tape recording. The benefit of this recording was that all subjects, regardless of condition, would hear the same discussion. The discussion/tape recording was very boring and dull. The three female discussants (actually a tape recording) appeared very uninterested in their discussion.
At the completion of the discussion subjects were asked to rate the discussion and the participants. Results suggested that subjects who experienced a severe initiation, compared to those who experienced a mild initiation or no initiation, rated the discussion and participants most positively. Subjects in the mild initiation condition versus the control condition did not significantly differ in their ratings of the discussion or the participants. These results suggest that individuals who experience a severe initiation also experience cognitive dissonance. Remember that cognitive dissonance is an uncomfortable state and that individuals are motivated to alleviate dissonance. Alleviation in this case involves changing one's attitudes. Hence, the severe initiation subjects viewing the discussion and the participants positively.
Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma (1971) reviewed research and theory on cognitive dissonance. Their specific focus was on the factors that lead to dissonance. They criticized dissonance theory for not clearly specifying these factors and interpreted past findings (related to these factors) in the context of impression management theory. Individuals engage in impression management when they control (or manage) the image (or impression) the present to others. In this instance impression management involves presenting a consistent image to others. This consistent image results positive impressions of stability, rationality, etc.. These positive impressions are linked to an individual's ability to influence others.
Tedeschi et al. (1971) suggest that the following factors lead to dissonance; discrepant attitudes and behaviors that are freely chosen; perceptions of commitment, or an inability to change discrepant behaviors; and the importance of the attitude/behavior involved in the inconsistency (the more important the attitude/behavior, the greater the likelihood of dissonance). Tedeschi et al. (1971) also suggest that some personality types may be more prone to dissonance. For example, individuals who are high in chronic anxiety and individuals who are concerned with the social desirability of their behaviors.
Each of these causes is related to others making an internal, or dispositional, attribution regarding attitudes/behaviors (Tedeschi et al., 1971). Because individuals are concerned with the impression they make on others, and because internal attributions are an integral part of the impression individuals make on others, factors such as freely chosen behavior contribute to dissonance. A freely chosen behavior, compared to a behavior that is coerced, is much more likely to be attributed to a personality disposition.
Alleviating dissonance, according to Tedeschi et al. (1971), does not necessarily constitute an actual change in attitudes. Rather, individuals may present a superficial appearance of change, when in actuality little to no change has occurred. This superficial appearance of change is related to impression management. Tedeschi et al. (1971) further suggest that "attitudinal change" (in quotations because attitudinal change may not be actually occurring) will most likely occur when the individual is concerned with the evaluations of others. For example, if others perceive inconsistency in two internally caused attitudes, then "attitudinal change" will occur. In the absence of this evaluation, "attitudinal change" is not as likely to occur. Tedeschi et al. (1971) also suggest that individuals engage in a costs/benefits analysis when determining whether to change attitudes/behaviors. This analysis is based on the perceptions of others. An immediate benefit of change may be restoring a positive image ("realizing one's mistake" for example). However, a long term cost may be a loss of credibility.
Recent research conducted by Elliot and Devine (1994) examined psychological discomfort as a factor in dissonance. They discuss the evidence suggesting that dissonance is an arousal producing state. When an individual experiences cognitive dissonance, he/she also experiences physiological arousal (Elliot & Devine, 1994). When this arousal is labeled as negative and viewed as internally caused (e.g., an individual freely choosing to engage in attitude discrepant behavior) it becomes dissonance arousal and, in turn, the motivation to reduce dissonance. The psychological discomfort comes into play upon the internal attribution.
Elliot and Devine (1994) focused on validating the experience of psychological discomfort. They predicted that subjects experiencing cognitive dissonance will experience greater psychological discomfort compared to subjects not experiencing dissonance; and that after changing their dissonant attitudes dissonant subjects will report the same level of psychological discomfort as non-dissonant subjects. Elliot and Devine's (1994) results supported their hypothesis suggesting an interpretation of cognitive dissonance as Festinger (1957) originally envisioned it.
Harmon-Jones, Brehm, Greenberg, Simon, and Nelson (1996), like Tedeschi et al. (1971), examined the causes of dissonance. Harmon-Jones et al. (1996) focused on negative consequences for others as a cause of dissonance. Subjects in their first experiment drank either a pleasant or unpleasant tasting beverage. All subjects then wrote a sentence suggesting that they liked the beverage. Some subjects were led to believe that they had a choice as to what kind of sentence they wrote, other subjects were led to believe that they had little choice. Immediately after writing the sentence subjects threw the piece of paper, on which they wrote the sentence, away. They then rated the beverage. Subjects who drank the unpleasant beverage and who were led to believe that they had a choice as to what kind of sentence to write experienced greater dissonance than subjects who drank the unpleasant beverage and were led to believe they had little choice as to what kind of sentence to write. The former, compared to the latter, subjects rated the beverage more positively. Remember, immediately after writing the sentence subjects threw it away. Therefore, dissonance occurred in the absence of negative consequences for others because no others would view or know about the sentence.
Cognitive dissonance research began in the late fifties and continues to be conducted today. Research continues to focus on the validity of dissonance theory. Although there may be differing perspectives on the causes of dissonance, research consistently suggests that dissonance is a valid phenomenon. A new focus appears to be applications of dissonance theory. For example, inducing dissonance as a means to encourage the use of condoms (e.g., Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991; Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, Fried, 1994). Regardless of what the future holds, cognitive dissonance is a lucrative and interesting field. References/Further Readings
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) conducted one of the first experiments on cognitive dissonance. Subjects were seventy-one male college students. They were told that they were participating in a experiment examining "Measures of Performance." Upon greeting subjects the experimenter reminded them that an assessment of experiments conducted at the university was being carried out by introductory psychology students. This assessment was announced previously in the subject's classes. The experimenter further explained that while the assessment was unrelated to the experiment the subject was about to participate in, the subject may be interviewed after his completion of the experiment (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
For the first experimental task subjects were required to put twelve spools on a tray, remove them, and then put them on the tray again. Subjects were instructed to use one hand while completing this task. The experimenter sat behind the subject, timing him with a stop watch, while he was completing this task. For the second experimental task subjects were presented with an S board. The S board contained forty-eight square pegs. The subject's task was to turn each peg a quarter of a turn clockwise using only one hand. Once again the experimenter sat behind the subject timing him with a stop watch. Each task took one-half hour to complete (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
The two experimental tasks were not intended to assess "Measure of Performance." Rather, they were a manipulation to induce cognitive dissonance. The goal of the experimenters was actually to create boring, uninteresting tasks. After the subjects completed the tasks the experimenter requested a "favor." He told the subjects that the experiment contained two conditions. One in which subjects were given no introduction to the experiment (this was the condition that the subject was supposedly in), and another in which subjects were given an introduction to the experiment. The experimenter further explained that a student, working for the experimenter, provides the introduction to the subjects. The experimenter also explained that the student includes several points in his introduction; that the experiment was interesting, enjoyable, and fun. After this explanation the experimenter asked the subject if he would wait to speak to this student. The subject was then led to the secretary's office to wait for the student (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
The subject waited in the secretary's office for four minutes, at which time the experimenter, looking somewhat embarrassed and anxious, asked to speak to the subject. The experimenter explained that the student could not make it that day and that another subject, who was in the introduction condition, was waiting to participate in the experiment. The experimenter then asked if the subject would be willing to stand in for the student, and tell the next subject that the experimental tasks were enjoyable, interesting, and fun (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
It is at this point in the experiment that the independent variable was manipulated. The subjects were either offered one dollar or twenty dollars for telling the next subject that the tasks were enjoyable, interesting, and fun. The subject was also informed that he may be called and asked to help the experimenter again for no additional compensation. Regardless of condition (one dollar or twenty dollars) subjects agreed to help the experimenter (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
Subjects were then led back to the secretary's office where the next subject was waiting. The next subject was actually a female student hired by the experimenter to pose as a subject. The female student said little until the subject began informing her that the experiment was interesting, etc.. At this point she informed the subject that she had heard, from a friend, that the experiment was boring. The subject then tried to convince the student that the experiment was interesting. After two minutes of talking to the female student the experimenter entered the room, took the female student to the testing room, and told the subject to see if an introductory psychology student wished to interview him related to the assessment of experiments conducted at the university (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
The interviewer, supposedly a student from an introductory psychology course, then interviewed the subject. This interview was actually the dependent measure in the experiment. Questions asked included whether the experimental tasks were interesting, enjoyable, and whether the subject would be willing to participate in a similar experiment (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
At this point it should be noted that there was a third, control, condition in the experiment. In the control condition subjects engaged in the spool and peg tasks. However, after these tasks they were immediately interviewed. The control condition subjects were not asked to step in for the student who could not make it, nor were they asked to talk to the next subject about the experiment. The control condition served as a measure of the tasks in the absence of cognitive dissonance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
In general the results indicated that the one dollar condition subjects, compared to both the twenty dollars and control condition subjects, rated the task as most enjoyable and interesting, and were most willing to participate in a similar experiment. The control condition subjects, compared to both the one dollar and twenty dollars condition subjects, rated the tasks as least enjoyable and interesting, and were least willing to participate in a similar experiment. These results suggest that the one dollar condition, compared to the twenty dollars condition, experienced the greatest effects of cognitive dissonance and therefore, the greatest pressure to change their attitudes toward the experimental task. Remember one way to alleviate cognitive dissonance is to change one's attitude. In this experiment the subject can not change his behavior, he has already told the female student that the experiment task was enjoyable, interesting, etc.. It is too late for the subject to change his behavior. The twenty dollar condition subjects, in contrast, experienced less pressure to change their attitudes toward the experimental task. The incentive (the twenty dollars) for engaging in the attitude discrepant behavior appeared to justify the behavior. This justification resulted in less pressure to change attitudes toward the experimental task (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
Another early experiment examining cognitive dissonance was conducted by Aronson and Mills (1959). They examined the effect of the severity of initiation into a group on evaluations of the group. Cognitive dissonance suggests that if individuals experience a severe initiation they are likely to experience cognitive dissonance. The cognitive dissonance in this instance involves a behavior (going through the severe initiation) attitude (whether membership in the group was actually worth the severe initiation) discrepancy. Sixty-three college females participated in Aronson and Mills' (1959) experiment. Subjects were told that they were going to discuss sex with other students. Subjects were further informed that the experimenter needed to determine whether the subject was comfortable with discussing this issue (sex), hence the "initiation."
The experiment contained one independent variable with three levels; severe initiation, mild initiation, and control condition. The severe initiation required subjects to read embarrassing sexually explicit material, out loud in the presence of the experimenter, in order to obtain admittance to the group. The mild initiation required subjects to read information that was somewhat embarrassing, in order to join the group. Once again the subjects read the information out loud and in the presence of the experimenter. The control group was not required to read any information prior to joining the group.
All subjects were granted admittance to the group. Subjects were also informed that there were required readings for each discussion. Since the subject had not read the required reading for this particular discussion, they were instructed to listen in on the discussion and not to participate. The subject then listened in on a discussion among three college females. The discussion was actually a tape recording. The benefit of this recording was that all subjects, regardless of condition, would hear the same discussion. The discussion/tape recording was very boring and dull. The three female discussants (actually a tape recording) appeared very uninterested in their discussion.
At the completion of the discussion subjects were asked to rate the discussion and the participants. Results suggested that subjects who experienced a severe initiation, compared to those who experienced a mild initiation or no initiation, rated the discussion and participants most positively. Subjects in the mild initiation condition versus the control condition did not significantly differ in their ratings of the discussion or the participants. These results suggest that individuals who experience a severe initiation also experience cognitive dissonance. Remember that cognitive dissonance is an uncomfortable state and that individuals are motivated to alleviate dissonance. Alleviation in this case involves changing one's attitudes. Hence, the severe initiation subjects viewing the discussion and the participants positively.
Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma (1971) reviewed research and theory on cognitive dissonance. Their specific focus was on the factors that lead to dissonance. They criticized dissonance theory for not clearly specifying these factors and interpreted past findings (related to these factors) in the context of impression management theory. Individuals engage in impression management when they control (or manage) the image (or impression) the present to others. In this instance impression management involves presenting a consistent image to others. This consistent image results positive impressions of stability, rationality, etc.. These positive impressions are linked to an individual's ability to influence others.
Tedeschi et al. (1971) suggest that the following factors lead to dissonance; discrepant attitudes and behaviors that are freely chosen; perceptions of commitment, or an inability to change discrepant behaviors; and the importance of the attitude/behavior involved in the inconsistency (the more important the attitude/behavior, the greater the likelihood of dissonance). Tedeschi et al. (1971) also suggest that some personality types may be more prone to dissonance. For example, individuals who are high in chronic anxiety and individuals who are concerned with the social desirability of their behaviors.
Each of these causes is related to others making an internal, or dispositional, attribution regarding attitudes/behaviors (Tedeschi et al., 1971). Because individuals are concerned with the impression they make on others, and because internal attributions are an integral part of the impression individuals make on others, factors such as freely chosen behavior contribute to dissonance. A freely chosen behavior, compared to a behavior that is coerced, is much more likely to be attributed to a personality disposition.
Alleviating dissonance, according to Tedeschi et al. (1971), does not necessarily constitute an actual change in attitudes. Rather, individuals may present a superficial appearance of change, when in actuality little to no change has occurred. This superficial appearance of change is related to impression management. Tedeschi et al. (1971) further suggest that "attitudinal change" (in quotations because attitudinal change may not be actually occurring) will most likely occur when the individual is concerned with the evaluations of others. For example, if others perceive inconsistency in two internally caused attitudes, then "attitudinal change" will occur. In the absence of this evaluation, "attitudinal change" is not as likely to occur. Tedeschi et al. (1971) also suggest that individuals engage in a costs/benefits analysis when determining whether to change attitudes/behaviors. This analysis is based on the perceptions of others. An immediate benefit of change may be restoring a positive image ("realizing one's mistake" for example). However, a long term cost may be a loss of credibility.
Recent research conducted by Elliot and Devine (1994) examined psychological discomfort as a factor in dissonance. They discuss the evidence suggesting that dissonance is an arousal producing state. When an individual experiences cognitive dissonance, he/she also experiences physiological arousal (Elliot & Devine, 1994). When this arousal is labeled as negative and viewed as internally caused (e.g., an individual freely choosing to engage in attitude discrepant behavior) it becomes dissonance arousal and, in turn, the motivation to reduce dissonance. The psychological discomfort comes into play upon the internal attribution.
Elliot and Devine (1994) focused on validating the experience of psychological discomfort. They predicted that subjects experiencing cognitive dissonance will experience greater psychological discomfort compared to subjects not experiencing dissonance; and that after changing their dissonant attitudes dissonant subjects will report the same level of psychological discomfort as non-dissonant subjects. Elliot and Devine's (1994) results supported their hypothesis suggesting an interpretation of cognitive dissonance as Festinger (1957) originally envisioned it.
Harmon-Jones, Brehm, Greenberg, Simon, and Nelson (1996), like Tedeschi et al. (1971), examined the causes of dissonance. Harmon-Jones et al. (1996) focused on negative consequences for others as a cause of dissonance. Subjects in their first experiment drank either a pleasant or unpleasant tasting beverage. All subjects then wrote a sentence suggesting that they liked the beverage. Some subjects were led to believe that they had a choice as to what kind of sentence they wrote, other subjects were led to believe that they had little choice. Immediately after writing the sentence subjects threw the piece of paper, on which they wrote the sentence, away. They then rated the beverage. Subjects who drank the unpleasant beverage and who were led to believe that they had a choice as to what kind of sentence to write experienced greater dissonance than subjects who drank the unpleasant beverage and were led to believe they had little choice as to what kind of sentence to write. The former, compared to the latter, subjects rated the beverage more positively. Remember, immediately after writing the sentence subjects threw it away. Therefore, dissonance occurred in the absence of negative consequences for others because no others would view or know about the sentence.
Cognitive dissonance research began in the late fifties and continues to be conducted today. Research continues to focus on the validity of dissonance theory. Although there may be differing perspectives on the causes of dissonance, research consistently suggests that dissonance is a valid phenomenon. A new focus appears to be applications of dissonance theory. For example, inducing dissonance as a means to encourage the use of condoms (e.g., Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991; Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, Fried, 1994). Regardless of what the future holds, cognitive dissonance is a lucrative and interesting field. References/Further Readings
Aronson, E., Fried, C. T., & Stone, J. (1991). Overcoming denial: Increasing the intention to use condoms through the induction of hypocrisy. American Journal of Public Health, 18, 1636-1640.
Aronson, E. & Mills, J. (1959). The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59, 177-180.
Cassel, R. N., Chow, P., & Demoulin, D. F. (2001). Comparing the cognitive dissonance of 116 juvenile delinquent boys with that of 215 typical high school students. Education, 121 (3), 449-453.
Elliot, A. J. & Devine, P. G. (1994). On the motivational nature of cognitive dissonance: Dissonance as psychological discomfort. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67. 382-394.
Cooper, J., & Fazio, R. H. (1984). A new look at dissonance theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 17, pp. 229-266). New York: Academic press.
Dickerson, C. A., Thibodeau, R., Aronson, E., & Miller, D. (1992). Using cognitive dissonance to encourage water conservation. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 22, 841-854.
Festinger, L. A. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, Ill: Row Peterson.
Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 38, 203-210.
Freedman, J. L., Cunninghman, J. A., & Krismer, K. (1992). Inferred values and the reverse-incentive effect in induced compliance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 357-368.
Harmon-Jones, E., Brehm, J. W., Greenberg, J., Simon, L., & Nelson, D. E. (1996). Evidence that the production of aversive consequences is not necessary to produce cognitive dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 5-16.
Jonas, E., Schulz-Hardt, S., Frey, D., & Thelen, N. (2001). Confirmation bias in sequential information search after preliminary decisions: An expansion of dissonance theoretical research on selective exposure to information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80 (4), 557-571.
Jones, D. N. & Ince, E. (2001). The effects of cognitive dissonance on interpersonal perception and reassertion. Current Research in Social Psychology, 7 (4).
Lodewijkx, H. F. M & Syroit, J. E. M. M. (2001). Affiliation during naturalistic severe and mild initiations: Some futher evidence against the severity-attraction hypothesis. Current Research in Social Psychology, 6 (7), 90-106.
Mahaffy, K. A. (1996). Cognitive dissonance and its resolution: A study of lesbian Christians. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 35, 392-402.
Prislin, R. & Pool, G. J. (1996). Behavior, consequences, and the self: Is all well that ends well? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 933-948.
Stone, J., Aronson, E., Crain, A. L., Winslow, M. P., Fried, C. B. (1994). Inducing hypocrisy as a means of encouraging young adults to use condoms. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 116-128.
Tedeschi, J., T., Schlenker, R., R., & Bonoma, R. V. (1971). Cognitive dissonance: Private ratiocination or public spectacle? American Psychologist, 26, 685-695.
Aronson, E. & Mills, J. (1959). The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59, 177-180.
Cassel, R. N., Chow, P., & Demoulin, D. F. (2001). Comparing the cognitive dissonance of 116 juvenile delinquent boys with that of 215 typical high school students. Education, 121 (3), 449-453.
Elliot, A. J. & Devine, P. G. (1994). On the motivational nature of cognitive dissonance: Dissonance as psychological discomfort. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67. 382-394.
Cooper, J., & Fazio, R. H. (1984). A new look at dissonance theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 17, pp. 229-266). New York: Academic press.
Dickerson, C. A., Thibodeau, R., Aronson, E., & Miller, D. (1992). Using cognitive dissonance to encourage water conservation. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 22, 841-854.
Festinger, L. A. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, Ill: Row Peterson.
Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 38, 203-210.
Freedman, J. L., Cunninghman, J. A., & Krismer, K. (1992). Inferred values and the reverse-incentive effect in induced compliance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 357-368.
Harmon-Jones, E., Brehm, J. W., Greenberg, J., Simon, L., & Nelson, D. E. (1996). Evidence that the production of aversive consequences is not necessary to produce cognitive dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 5-16.
Jonas, E., Schulz-Hardt, S., Frey, D., & Thelen, N. (2001). Confirmation bias in sequential information search after preliminary decisions: An expansion of dissonance theoretical research on selective exposure to information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80 (4), 557-571.
Jones, D. N. & Ince, E. (2001). The effects of cognitive dissonance on interpersonal perception and reassertion. Current Research in Social Psychology, 7 (4).
Lodewijkx, H. F. M & Syroit, J. E. M. M. (2001). Affiliation during naturalistic severe and mild initiations: Some futher evidence against the severity-attraction hypothesis. Current Research in Social Psychology, 6 (7), 90-106.
Mahaffy, K. A. (1996). Cognitive dissonance and its resolution: A study of lesbian Christians. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 35, 392-402.
Prislin, R. & Pool, G. J. (1996). Behavior, consequences, and the self: Is all well that ends well? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 933-948.
Stone, J., Aronson, E., Crain, A. L., Winslow, M. P., Fried, C. B. (1994). Inducing hypocrisy as a means of encouraging young adults to use condoms. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 116-128.
Tedeschi, J., T., Schlenker, R., R., & Bonoma, R. V. (1971). Cognitive dissonance: Private ratiocination or public spectacle? American Psychologist, 26, 685-695.
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16.11.09
DON'T KID YOURSELF, WE CAN ALL BE EVIL
From The Sunday Timesb (u.k.)
April 8, 2007
Don’t kid yourself, we can all be evil
Three devastating experiments suggest we are all capable of terrible acts. But Bryan Appleyard asks the man who devised one what it proves
Today — Easter Sunday — is the day on which we were promised, through the resurrection of Christ, that evil would be conquered. It has not happened yet. Evil is as potent a force in human affairs as it ever was. It is also as much of a puzzle. What is it? Why is it? Where does evil reside? In the universe, in society or in you and me?
Three devastating psychological experiments in the 20th century seemed to suggest answers to these questions. The first — the Asch conformity experiment — showed that people could be led into denying the evidence of their own eyes by their desire to conform, blindly to accept the authority of the group. The second — the Milgram experiment — showed that people were prepared to subject others to potentially lethal electric shocks because they were encouraged to do so by authority figures. And the third — the Stanford prison experiment (SPE) — showed that perfectly ordinary well-balanced people could be turned into savage tyrants or cowering victims simply by the situations in which they found themselves.
Now Philip Zimbardo, the mastermind behind the SPE, has written his own account of the experiment and its meaning, and of his role in the investigations of the horrific — and, crucially, photographed — abuses at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison. Zimbardo’s book The Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Evil (Rider, £18.99) is a polemic. The author believes passionately that anybody can “turn evil”. He does not believe in evil as a disposition — a character trait — but as the product of a situation. Evil thus resides not in people but in the system that creates these situations.
The experiment, conducted in 1971, could not have been more simple nor, on the face of it, more harmless. Student volunteers were divided into prisoners and guards. The prisoners were taken to a mock-up jail in Stanford University where the guards imposed a regime designed to suppress individuality and humiliate.
With horrific speed the guards turned into ever more creative abusers and, occasional rebellions apart, the prisoners into pathetic cowering deindividualised wrecks. The fact that they all knew the situation was entirely artificial did nothing to stop the slide into barbarity.
Watching it all with forensic detachment was Zimbardo, whose future wife Christina Maslach, a social psychologist, joined the experiment’s “parole board”. He admits he was drawn into the increasingly desperate logic of the situation. But Maslach was horrified and persuaded him to cut the SPE from its planned two weeks to six days on ethical grounds. Would he do it again?
“The answer is yes. Do I feel remorse about the kids’ suffering? Yes, but I’ve worked hard all these years to make sure the gain is worth the cost and I’ve done it — in lectures, I work in prison reform, I helped change one legal ruling based on the research. It did a lot of good.”
When the Abu Ghraib abuses came to light in 2004 Zimbardo saw striking similarities with the SPE. Isolated within the confines of the prison, a group of guards expanded their assigned roles to include horrific acts of abuse against Iraqi prisoners. Zimbardo was struck by the instant reactions of the army authorities — that this was just a case of a few bad apples: “How could they possibly know that?” he asks.
For him the bad-apple theory is never right. It is the rotten barrel that turns the apples bad. He provided evidence for the defence of one of the guards — Ivan “Chip” Frederick — who, he argued, had no pathology preceding the incidents to suggest he was a bad apple. His evidence was rejected and Frederick received an eight-year sentence.
At the heart of the bad-apple argument is a theory of evil. This is that it resides within individuals. Evil, for Zimbardo, is in the system, not the individual. The extraordinary and unique plasticity of the human brain enables us to create systems and roles that engender evil. That very plasticity, however, can offer hope. Zimbardo believes that if we accept the lessons of these experiments we can construct better systems. Furthermore we should educate for heroism.
There was a hero at Abu Ghraib — Joseph Darby, an extravagantly ordinary individual who passed on the pictures of abuse to higher authorities — and in most theatres of evil, heroes emerge, albeit in a minority. Parents, Zimbardo believes, should get away from the “don’t be a hero” advice often given to children and replace it with active encouragement to speak out against evil.
Is this strictly situational explanation of evil the right conclusion to draw from these three sensational experiments?
the first thing to note is the context. Solomon Asch’s conformity experiments were conducted in 1951, Stanley Milgram’s obedience to authority experiments in 1963 and the SPE eight years later. Milgram had specifically set out to explain the way Germans had so easily accepted the Holocaust, and both Nazism and Stalinism cast their terrible shadows over all these experiments. All three studies can in fact be seen as responses to the 20th century phenomenon of industrialised evil. Confronted with Auschwitz, the normal human response is: how could anybody do that? Implicit in that response is the statement: I couldn’t.
But the experiments show we could. Nothing in the volunteers’ background indicated the possibility of evil behaviour. These people were you and me.
The simple bad-apple argument is an inadequate response to Abu Ghraib. This was a systemic failure in the US military that created a climate in which Iraqi prisoners could be regarded as sub-human. But bad appleism is also challenged by Christian theology. Christ rose on this day as a sign that we could be redeemed from the original sin.
This, for Christians, lies at the heart of theodicy — the explanation of the ways of God to man. Evil exists because of our free will and disobedience. Why a good, omnipotent God should allow this to happen has been the subject of 2,000 years of agonised and inconclusive debate. But the implication of the idea of original sin is clear: nobody can cast the first stone because nobody is free from sin.
Furthermore the situationist conclusion drawn from these experiments has been challenged by psychologists who point out that the responses were not uniform. Some did indeed refuse to accept the opportunity for evil. They did this either by walking away — a passive acceptance of evil reflecting Edmund Burke’s statement, “All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing” — or heroically challenging the evil-doing system.
If there are such varied responses, such heroism, then surely character — disposition — must play a part? Intuitively this feels convincing. It is, for example, possible but not strictly plausible to explain Hitler solely as a force unleashed by the system. There do seem to be people unusually endowed with a capacity for evil. One might say such people are unleashed by a system; but could it not equally plausibly be said that such people create the evil system?
And finally there is an awkward logical problem with the purely systemic explanation. Systems engender evil, says Zimbardo. But systems are made by humans. Society is a human construct. Blaming systems or society may reduce the burden of guilt on the individual, but it does nothing to exculpate humanity. We systematically do evil. Zimbardo blames this on the plasticity of the human brain. But who is doing the moulding? Only humans can be placed in the dock.
This is the ultimate justification for the concept of original sin. Evil exists only in the human realm. A lion is innocent of murder when it kills a gazelle; humans are uniquely guilty when they herd others of their kind into gas chambers. Systemically or individually, we and we alone are responsible for these rivers of blood and oceans of tears. The human truth of the need for a god to die for this unendurable guilt is why, in spite of our disbelief, we still call this day Easter Sunday.
www.bryanappleyard.comwww.bryanappleyard.com
7.11.09
12.9.09
DESTRUCTIVE OBEDIENCE - WHEN TO CONFORM OR NOT
Destructive obedience,
particularly obedience to authority (e.g., Milgram 1974), has had and continues to have an enormous impact in the field of social psychology. Current theories will be explored as possible explanations to this type of behavior. Specific theories to be examined include; Normative influence theory (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), and Foot-in-the-door theory (Freedman & Fraser, 1966). In addition, questions introduced in regard to the validity and reliability of the indicated theories will be evaluated.
Group Conformity and Obedience: Normative Influence, Cognitive Dissonanace, and Foot-in-door-effect
The current review will explore examples of normative social influence (Asch, 1951), such as the classic line-judging study of Asch (1951,1956) as well as current research contributing to the topic of this theory which has demonstrated there is a fundamental human need to belong to social group (Asch, 1951), indicating the more an individual sees other individuals behaving in a certain way or making particular decisions (Asch, 1951), the more obligated the individual feels to conform to the rules and behaviors of that particular group. Cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and other related theories will also be explored in relation to obedience to authority despite conflicting moral values, including the landmark study on destructive obedience conducted by Milgram (1974).
Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) hypothesizes that human beings are motivated to strive towards harmony, balance, or consistency among various components of their cognitive systems. A central premise of cognitive dissonance theory is that when a person holds two contradictory or inconsistent cognitions, he or she will experience an aversive inner state known as cognitive dissonance and will be motivated to restore consistency by various means which will be explored in further detail throughout this review (Foster & Nicholas, 2000). Current studies which expand on Milgram’s findings will also be examined. Lastly, a more current theory related to destructive obedience and conformity will be assessed which was first posited by Freedman & Fraser (1966) and later expanded upon by subsequent research and reviews (e.g., Burger’s meta-analysis, 1999, Burger and Caldwell 2003), some of which will be evaluated in the current review as well as possible alternative explanations for destructive conformity and obedience.
Historical Overview ;
Though many studies had been conducted prior to those of Solomon Asch, Asch is considered one of the pioneers in the study of group conformity, which would ultimately lead to hundreds of subsequent experiments, including the classic studies of Stanley Milgram. The Asch conformity experiments were a series of experiments that had a profound impact on the views of group conformity at that time in the psychological community.-
THE MILGRAM EXPERIMENT IN MORE DETAIL:
The participants were all seated in a classroom, both confederates and the real participant (the actual participant was strategically placed in such a way where he or she would be one of the last to answer). Though the correct answer was obvious, the confederates had been pre-instructed to give an incorrect answer on every occasion. Even though the actual participant showed extreme discomfort, many conformed to the majority view of the others in the room, even when the majority was obviously wrong. Moreover, the participants in Asch’s study were not coerced in any way to conform to the group.
On the first measure, Asch (1951, 1956) found that approximately two thirds (63.2%) get rid of percent numbers of the total responses were independent, or correct. Approximately one third (36.8%) same here conformed to the erroneous majority. As predicted, a high number of experimental participants conformed to social pressure from a group of peers. In the control group, participants were given the test alone and nearly all of them gave the correct answer. These results support the concept of normative influence, which is based on the desire for social approval (Levine, 1999). As a result of Asch’s experiments, as well as others, such as Sherif (1936) and Frank (1944), subsequent experiments emerged, including those of Milgram (1974).
Inspired by the Nuremburg trials where Nazi officers would often plead that the were only following orders, Milgram integrated these social psychology experiments of conformity and obedience in an attempt to better understand the ability of seemingly normal average citizens to commit acts as devastating as the systematic slaughter millions of innocent people in the name of obedience. Milgram’s groundbreaking experiment tested obedience to authority by recruiting participants from diverse social and educational backgrounds under the guise of studying the effectiveness of punishment on learning behavior. Both participants were introduced to each other. The confederate was a 47 year old mild-mannered accountant who was actually to be the learner (unbeknownst to the real participant). Both participants were given a slip of paper in order to randomly assign a “teacher” and a “learner.” The “learner” was actually an actor and claimed to have been assigned as the “learner,” so that the actual participant was led to believe that the roles had been chosen randomly. In actuality, both of the slips of paper said “teacher.” At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter made it clear that the participants were free to leave with the money that had been promised to them for their participation at any time during the experiment. The experimenter explained to both participants that the punishment would be given via electric shock. Both men were escorted into a room that had what looked similar to an electric chair in which the learner was strapped into in order to eliminate excessive movement. It was evident to the teacher that the learner would not be able to free himself if he chose to do so. The main measure of the experiment for any participant was the maximum level of shock the teacher administered before he refused to go any further, (thereby initiating action). Electrodes were then pasted to the learner’s wrist to provide more efficient conduction of the electrical shocks and “avoid blisters or burns.” He was then told he would be learning word pairs and that when he made an error he would receive a shock of increasing intensity for every mistake in increments of 15 volts. The teacher was then escorted back into another room and seated in front of an impressive electric shock generator. The generator consisted of 30 switches in sequential 15-VOLT shock intervals from left to right going up to 450 volts. Before the real experiment began, the teacher and learner conducted a “practice run.” In order to ensure the instructions of the experiment were fully understood. The teacher was also given a 45 volt shock before the experiment began as an example of what he would be administering to the learner. It is noteworthy to mention that when Milgram asked a group of psychologists to estimate the percentage of participants who would go all the way prior to the experiment, they predicted approximately (this will be one to two percent – no numbers) 1-2%, presumably the “sadists” of the group. The teacher conducted the paired-associate learning task to the learner (Milgram, 1974). If the learner answered incorrectly, the teacher announced the voltage level prior to administering the shock. This served to continually remind the participants of the increasing intensity of shocks administered. The learner had coordinated a designated verbal response to particular voltage levels. For example, at 75 volts, the learner grunted, at120 volts, the learner shouted at the experimenter that the shocks were becoming painful, at 150 volts, he screamed to be released from the experiment and each increase in voltage resulted in more agonizing screams from the “learner.” At 300 volts, the learner shouted that he would not answer anymore questions. He would not answer after 300 volts, other than agonizing screams. Shortly thereafter, not a sound was heard from the learner and it could be assumed by the teacher that the learner was either unconscious or dead. Even so, 63% of the participants went all the way to the maximum 450 volts. Milgram’s classic experiment on destructive obedience has been replicated and modified in countless studies, Milgram’s studies on authority as well as more studies of similar nature, such as the Stanford Prison Experiment (Zimbardo, 1973) and the more current studies of administrative obedience, such as the Utrecht studies (Meeus & Raaijmakers, 1995).
Normative social influence suggests that human beings have a fundamental need to belong and to be accepted by social groups, and in order to maintain social harmony, the individual may comply with the norms of a majority group, both explicitly and implicitly. This theory suggests that the more a person sees others behaving in a certain way, the more likely he or she will feel obligated to conform, even if the person is amongst a group of strangers.
normative influence produced public compliance but not private acceptance
Participants also believed that they would be more likely to change their opinions when it was mentioned that the disagreeing person gave a good argument (delete reference here). These results support the notion that people’s perceptions of the relative effectiveness of informational and normative influence are influenced by task type.
Milgram destructive obedience studies are relevant examples (1974) in which it was estimated by Milgram’s colleges that approximately 1-2% of the participants would fully comply; the “sadists” of society. When participants in following studies were explained in detail the Milgram Obedience to Authority study, approximately 9% said they might have “gone all the way.” In fact, 63% complied fully (Milgram, 1974). Dual process (Normative/Informational) theory (Deutch & Gerrard, 1953) has been criticized from a number of perspectives. Some state that the distinction between normative and informational influence is unclear, or that there is a third type of influence. Other factors such as culture may have a significant impact on social influence.
Mess argues that conformity is a natural evolutional side effect similar to that of the obedience of the universal laws of physics, stating that, “If an individual does not automatically react in that [conventional] way, it does not ‘disobey’ the ‘law of the herd’. It is not fully part of its herd (not fully integrated into it) and, as a result, it will probably be liquidated sooner or later (Mess, 2002).” Mess argues that obedience (even blind obedience) is a basic human trait, similar to the obedience of a planet’s rotation or that of gravity, and that these two mechanisms of obeying (normative obedience and obedience to universal laws) are essentially similar in nature. It is important to note that this review has found no empirical evidence in support of this idea proposed by Mess (2002). Nonetheless, this review seems an appropriate an intriguing example of an obvious cultural discrepancy (a collectivist society’s point of view) in the assessment of normative influence and conformity and/or obedience in general.
Cognitive Dissonance Theory
Essentially, cognitive dissonance (delete “theory”) occurs when there is a discrepancy between two (or more) attitudes or an attitude and behavior(s)(Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959). EXAMPLE OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: For example, a person may have a negative attitude toward smoking cigarettes, but he or she continues to smoke despite the apparent discrepancy between his or her thoughts (attitudes) and behavior. This may lead the person to experience cognitive dissonance. Possible causes of dissonance include the importance of the attitude(s) involved in the inconsistency; choice versus no choice involved in the inconsistent behavior; and/or negative consequences from others that result from the inconsistent behavior.
Milgram’s participants reported they were acting against their beliefs for the benefit of scientific advancemen
FOOT IN THE DOOR – BRIEF INTRODUCTION:
The foot-in-the-door effect is a means of gaining compliance gradually (Freedman & Fraser, 1966). This technique involves making an initial small request, and then following this initial request up with a second larger request. The foot in the door technique is effective due to shifts in self perception. Upon granting the first request an individual's view of him or herself may shift in the direction of greater helpfulness. This shift in self perception increases the likelihood that the individual will grant the second larger request.
Fads and fashions lean heavily on normative social influence. So do racial, political and other situations of persuasion.
So what?
To change a person’s behavior, put them in a group who (perhaps primed) clearly all exhibit the desired behavior. Then engineer the situation so the person must exhibit the behavior or face potential rejection or other social punishment. If they do not comply, ensure the group gives steadily increasing social punishment rather than rejecting the target person immediately. When they do comply, they should receive social reward (eg. praise, inclusion).
Defending
Where you want to do something and the group in which you currently are socially punishes you for doing it, make a conscious decision as to whether it is worth fighting back or just giving up and leaving. If they mean nothing to you, just carry on and ignore them.
It can also be very heartening to watch other people resisting (and your doing so may well give heart to other doubters).
You can also acquire idiosyncrasy credits, where the group puts up with your eccentricities. To do this, be consistent in what you do, whilst also showing that in doing so you are not threatening the integrity of the group.
**Obviously, being trapped in an environment against our will eliminates the solution of “simply leaving. Either conform or “acquire idiosyncrasy credits,” which is almost impossible.”**
U HITLER AND THE NAZI REGIME
chapter I 1
hitler’s inauguration 2
no-so-subtle anti-semitism 3
chapter II 4
M
(incomplete copy)
Brainwashing in its most massive and destructive form. hitler had years to subtly and cleverly weave his finely tuned words into the minds of the germans, beginning with propaganca so benign, most people would hardly see any radical or conflicting beliefs leaping off the pages-warning signs of what was to come- such as; Hitler’s beliefs and “solutions” to racial conflict, desire for world comination, genocide, and the like . . . he wrote about unemployment and possible solutions to political shortcomings, only to slowly contaminate each letter, packet, pamphlet with a little bit of racism here and a little bit of distaste for the way europe treated germany in other there . . . (a sore spot, so soon after wwi).
hitler didn’t simply slam his radical ideas onto the people all at once – he used a carefully laid out formula of subtlety, time ,patience, and a lot of patriotism (this does not mean that the changes were fully welcomed and there was no bloodshed. The nazis tolerated no dissension or political challange and were brutal in their responses, as well as extreme in their propaganda crusade (see blog below for details). Then there was the odd “pied piper” effect that bedazzled millions upon millions. Even with doubts, how do you look around at your fellow citizens and friends and family and still resiist? and then comes the punishment. there is always a negative consequence involved in non-conformity within a totalitarian regime such as this (which is analagous to ccm, tb, high impact, etc, etc, etc. - fill in the blank. hitler was able to naturally manipulate all of the theories that i discussed in my paper, and it came to him naturally. he became like a drug. (though not really the case of these wwasp programs, it still becomes very difficult to dissassimilate from the communal whole and reintegrate into society – creating an intense fear (in my case)- of leaving the hostile and tremendously unhappy environment)…..
After the death of Hindenburg on 2 August 1934, Hitler called a
referendum to approve his assumption of full power as Führer and Chancellor ofGermany. Rudolf Hess gave this speech on 14 August 1934, shortly before the 19August referendum in which 90% of the voters approved Hitler's increasedpowers.
Electing Adolf Hitler
Führer/hitler q & a session on race/hheritage
by Rudolf Hess:
“National Socialists! Fellow German citizens!
I have rarely given a speech as difficult as this one. It is a challenge to attempt to
prove the good of something as obvious as Hitler's assumption of Hindenburg's
position. For fourteen years I have been convinced that he is the only man able to
master Germany's fate. This conviction has grown over the years, as the original
emotional feeling found new support in endless ways that have demonstrated
Adolf Hitler's remarkable leadership abilities. It is hard for me, now that I see the
realization of fourteen years of hopes, to gather the various reasons that explain,,,how Adolf Hitler has become the highest and only Führer of the German people.
Whether through good luck or providence, I found in the summer of 1920 a small
room in the Sterneckerbräu in which one Adolf Hitler, whom I had never heard of,
gave a speech to a few dozen people. His clear, logical and persuasive speech laid
out a new political program. This man expressed my own vague feelings as a
veteran of the war, making clear what was necessary for the nation's salvation.
He outlined a new Germany from the heart of a front soldier, a Germany that I
suddenly realized was the one that had to become reality!
This man had driving passion, persuasive logic, and astonishing knowledge. A powerful faith streamed from him — I had never experienced its like. What was
most remarkable was that I and the other entirely rational members of the
audience did not laugh as he in all seriousness explained that the flag of the new
movement for which he and his movement fought would one day fly over the Reichstag, over the Palace of Berlin, indeed over every German building. It wouldbe the victorious symbol of a new, honorable, nationalist and socialist Germany. At that moment in the Sterneckbräu there were really only two possibilites. Either I would leave this fool immediately, or — as I did — accept the conviction: This man will save Germany, if anyone can!”
A racial relationship is also evident in the same or similar cultural
products, sagas, legends and customs.
What were and are the particular characteristics of the NordicRace?
Courage, bravery, creative ability and desire, loyalty.
The German people is, along with the English, Danish, Norwegian and
Swedish, the most racially pure of the European peoples. With regards
to the purity of language, the Scandinavian peoples are in first place.
Its Gothic script
is particularly lovely, and it should be maintained……
**because some of the material is so offensive, I’ve omitted parts. If you would like the entire (quite long) propaganda packet, including this speech, unedited, then lset me know. the material dates from 1931 or 1932 all the way to post-war 1945, Maybe later. As far as I know, Dr. Bytwerk translated ALL of thes information from german to english. I also have his blog and website info if interested (he is a practicing professor & historian).**
“q & a session . . . . . . .”
…..Which race must the National Socialist race fight against?
The jewish.
….While the German people was fighting a life and death battle during the
World War, the Jew incited people at home and seduced them into
treason. The November Revolution of 1918 that brought about
Germany's collapse was the work of the Jew.
In countless newspapers in Germany and abroad, he brought everything
German into the mud, slandering us and inciting our enemies even more
than they already were. His lackeys in leading positions in the Reich
persecuted the National Socialist movement, bringing the fighters for a
new Germany before judges and throwing them into prison.
He corrupted Germans through bad books, and mocked true literature
and German music, replacing it with ungermanic music. Everywhere, his
influence was destructive.
What is racial defilement?
Forgetting our spirit and our blood. A careless disregard of our nature
and a contempt for our blood. No German man may take a Jewish
woman as his wife, and no German girl may marry a Jew. Those who do
that exclude themselves from the community of the German people.
What must the National Socialist movement do?
Adolf Hitler said:
"Care must be taken, at least in our nation, that the
deadliest enemy (the Jew) is recognized, and that the battle against him
is seen as the shining symbol of a brighter day that will also show other
peoples the path to the salvation of fighting Aryan humanity."
???
Hitler makes this primary directive sound like the German people are attacking the devil himself for their own salvation (which is probably about how he felt about the issue)
Which European people disregard the racial question?
France. It has accepted large numbers of blacks into its army. It has
given them the same political rights as the whites. Thus it can happen
that black officers command whites. Blacks and Moroccans fought
against Germany in the World War…. **(parts are omitted here)**
…..Germans — never forget that!
What does your people mean to you?
You are born into your people, my child, of a German mother. Your
father is a German. And you belong to the German people just as every
part of your body belongs to you. You are a link in a great chain, a part of
the whole. Alone, you are nothing, but when you live in your people you
are everything. Your people's destiny is your destiny. Its struggles and
sorrows, its joys and its miseries, are yours. All Germans are your
brothers. You may not think, want or do anything that harms your
people! The history of your people is great and glorious, and you can be
proud of it. The days of betrayal and the years of shame that Germany
had to endure between 1918 and 1933 are a warning to you. You must
work and create for the resurrection of your Fatherland.
The greatness of your people
calls you to loyalty! Never forget that
Frederick the Great and Bismarck were your brothers, as are those
heroes of the World War who sleep in foreign soil or in the depths of the
sea! The war memorials in the streets of the cities and the market places
of the villages call to you. Never forget that we cheerfully shed our
blood
for you, for Germany's holy soil, for the good and the life of this great
people!
****trust me, the political jargon gets a lot worse than this as time passes.
[Page copyright © 2003 by Randall Bytwerk. (i have all his info if interested)
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